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The Danger of Illusion: A Critique of
Safety Regulations in the Television
and Motion Picture Industry
By SHAWN M. CHRISTIANSON*
S. CLAIRE SOPER**
The cost of a thing is the amount of what I will call life which is
required to be exchanged for it, immediately or in the long run.
-Henry David Thoreau, Walden
I
Introduction
In the early morning hours of July 23, 1982, actor Vic Morrow
and two children, Renee Shinn Chen and Myca Dinh Le, were
killed in an accident during the filming of the four-segment
movie, "Twilight Zone."' Witnesses described the accident as
occurring when an "explosive fireball ... damaged the heli-
copter's tail rotor, sending the aircraft spiraling into the
streambed that Morrow and the two children were crossing as
part of a movie combat scene." All three actors were killed
instantly.2
* Member, Third Year Class. B.A., Boston College, 1981.
** Member, Third Year Class. B.A., University of Pacific, 1980.
1. L.A. Times, July 27, 1982, § H (Metro), at 1, col. 5.
2. Id. Since the July 23, 1982 accident, the California Division of Occupational
Safety and Health (CAL/OSHA) has assessed fines totalling $62,375 against John Lan-
dis, the director of the film, and others, for 36 violations of the safety code. Landis,
production executives Dan Allingham and George Folsey, and Warner Bros. studios
have each agreed to pay the maximum fine of $5000 assessed against them by the State
Labor Commissioner for violations of state labor laws. Landis, Folsey, Allingham, spe-
cial effects coordinator Paul Stewart, and Dorcey Wingo, the helicopter pilot, were
charged with involuntary manslaughter in Los Angeles County Grand Jury indict-
ments. On April 23, 1984, Landis, Wingo, and Stewart were ordered to stand trial on the
involuntary manslaughter charges. The charges against Allingham and Folsey were
dismissed. If convicted, the three face maximum prison terms of six years.
Wrongful death suits brought by the parents of the two children, including a $200
million suit brought by the parents of Renee Chen are pending. A similar suit by the
daughters of Vic Morrow was settled in December 1983. Terms of the settlement were
not released.
The Federal Aviation Administration has revoked Wingo's pilot's license for "care-
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The "Twilight Zone" accident immediately became the focus
of intense media, legislative, and public interest,3 and yet, it is
only the most recent in a series of tragic accidents to strike
Hollywood.
On June 25, 1980, actress-stuntwoman Heidi Von Beltz was
left a quadriplegic when a car crashed during the filming of the
movie "Cannonball Run."4 The accident occurred when the
sports car in which Von Beltz was a passenger veered out of
control and crashed head-on into one of the oncoming vehi-
cles.5 A $1.1 million workers' compensation settlement was ap-
proved for the actress, making it the largest workers'
compensation award in United States history.6 In addition, be-
tween June 1980 and January 1981, three camera operators died
in film-related accidents. 7 Unofficial Screen Actors Guild
(SAG) statistics report that in 1982, 200-250 injuries occurred
during the production of motion pictures.8
This note surveys and analyzes the system of regulation
which affects the safety of employees working in the motion
picture and television industry. It focuses on California laws
and regulations, and intra-industry promulgations which
govern film safety. Additionally, it critiques the shortcomings
and omissions in the state legislation and offers proposals for
enhancing employee safety.9
I!
Background
While a review of the injury and illness data for the motion
picture and television industry does not "[indicate] that this is
an industry which has as high a number of injuries and ill-
less or reckless" flying on the set and Landis and Folsey have been replaced as the
director and producer of "Dick Tracy," a film on which they were to begin shooting in
October 1983.
The film, 'Twilight Zone," premiered on July 25, 1983, the day the indictments were
handed down, with the fatal scene excised.
3. L.A. Times, July 30, 1982, § VI (Calendar) at 1, col. 2.
4. See Complaint at 7-11, Von Beltz v. Cannonball Productions, No. 370 583, Los
Angeles Super. Ct. (June 15, 1982).
5. L.A. Times, Jan. 4, 1983, § II (Metro), at 1, col. 1.
6. S.F. Chronicle, Jan. 4, 1983, § I, at 2.
7. Farr, Are The Thrills Worth Dying For? T.V. GUIDE, Mar. 13, 1982, at 4-5.
8. Miranda Dunne, Hollywood Hazards, KPIX-Channel 5 Eyewitness News, Feb.
10, 1982, Segment 1.
9. Although there is an entire body of law protecting the safety of children work-
ing in film, this note will not discuss the industry's child labor laws.
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nesses as that of agriculture, construction or heavy manufac-
turing,"'10 any statistics regarding accidents in the film industry
must be viewed with caution due to the difficulty of obtaining
accurate and complete statistics." As one commentator has
noted, "[n]obody knows the true accident statistics .... A
tremendous number of people are hurt but the studios don't
want accidents reported .... [TJhe studios can either hide
the cost, or they can have it insured. In the meantime, they
break every safety rule in the book."' 2
The SAG Stunt and Safety Committee reported that be-
tween October 1981 and October 1982, the Guild "received over
a hundred film company accident reports on injuries to SAG
members incurred on the sets in town or on location ....
10. Employee Safety in California's Motion Picture and Television Industry: Joint
Hearing of the Assembly Labor and Employment Committee and the Senate Industrial
Relations Committee, Oct. 8, 1982, at 61 (statement of Art Carter, Chief of CAL/OSHA)
[hereinafter cited as Film Safety Hearing Transcripts ]. All position designations (i.e.
Chief of CAL/OSHA, Assemblyman) are pertinent to the date on which the joint hear-
ings took place. Subsequent changes in position are not noted.
11. Statistics must be considered in light of their industry specificity, timeliness,
and reporting method. The most complete official information to date is provided
through CAL/OSHA, although more industry specific, current, and complete statistics
rest with the Screen Actors Guild (SAG). SAG statistics, which are not yet public
information, report 200-250 production-related injuries, either fatal or otherwise, for
1982. See Dunne, supra note 8. However, these statistics would not include film per-
formers such as the two children killed in the 'Twilight Zone" accident because they
were not SAG members. See S.F. Chronicle, Dec. 25, 1983, (Datebook), at 25, col. 2.
The CAL/OSHA statistics from 1980, on which Art Carter based his assessment of the
accident rate in the film industry, include only injuries stemming from motion pic-
tures, filmed either for television or theaters. Thus, any accidents which occurred dur-
ing production of weekly television serials, such as "CHiPs" or "Dukes of Hazzard"
would be omitted. Under the rubric of motion pictures, the accident statistics include
motion picture distribution as well as production, so an injury to a popcorn vendor
would appear in the same compilation as an injury to a stuntman. There has been no
differentiation made between motion picture production and theater distribution since
1975. Also, it is notable that the illness-injury rate from CAL/OSHA statistics includes
all of the industry's employee exposure hours instead of only the production-oriented
hours. Thus, because large studios employ many office workers, the total employee
hours may be skewed away from production-oriented statistics. This would keep the
total injury rate low in the motion picture industry when the actual production-related
injury rate may be significantly higher. The injury-illness findings of the 1980 CAL/
OSHA statistics suggest that there were an average of 60,800 persons annually em-
ployed in the motion picture industry and 7.1 out of 100 full-time workers missed at
least one day of work due to a job-related illness or injury. The workers' compensation
statistics for 1980, a separate table entitled "disabling work injuries," indicate that 1,020
injuries occurred in the motion picture industry, resulting in lost or restricted activity
workdays. Interview with Karen Jones, Research Manager of the Division of Labor
Statistics and Research of Work Injury and Illness Statistics Section, in San Francisco
(Feb. 23, 1983).
12. Farr, supra note 7, at 8.
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[A] dditional information of safety or the lack of it, has come
from various stunt organizations and individuals who have ob-
served accidents on the sets, which went unreported offi-
cially .... ,13 The under-reporting of accidents on Hollywood
sets is often attributed to the status of camera operators and
stunt performers as free-lancers who are dependent on the in-
dustry's goodwill for employment. They are "hired for individ-
ual productions ... and their livelihoods often depend on
carefully cultivated relationships with employers." As one vet-
eran stuntman noted, "lilt takes a long time to get into this
business, and no one wants to get out of it overnight."' 4
Although the frequency of accidents is difficult to verify, the
potential for severe injury is acknowledged:
Statistics compiled by the Department of Industrial Relations
indicate that the injury rate for the motion picture and televi-
sion industry is not disproportionate and that for the most part
the industry has been successful at reducing hazards to work-
ers. However, the potential for injury, especially with respect
to the staging of stunts, is so substantial and involves such cal-
culated and planned risks that periodic legislative inquiry is
warranted.' 5
The potential for severe injury stems from the unique nature
of the motion picture and television industry. The film indus-
try's foundation is illusion, and the problems inherent in recre-
ating the make-believe have escalated as the public's appetite
for ever more spectacular stunts has increased. 16 The thrills
that ensure successful box office draw and impressive televi-
13. Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 38-39 (statement of Robert
Herron, Chairman of SAG Stunt and Safety Committee).
14. London, safety first, last or if ever? L.A. Times, Feb. 6, 1983, (Calendar), at 1, col.
1. This problem was emphasized by Ed Asner, President of SAG, prior to the contract
talks between SAG and the Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers
(AMPTP) in May 1983. He suggested that, while toughening safety standards is a ma-
jor concern, the issue goes much deeper. He described the problem as "unspoken
psychological peer pressure" and emphasized that SAG members must "learn how to
say 'no' when it's requisite for the safety of life and limb. We [SAG] have to teach
ourselves to blow the whistle on safety problems ...... LA. Times, May 17, 1983, (Cal-
endar), at 6, col. 1.
15. Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at i (introductory letter by As-
semblyman Chet Wray, Chairman of Assembly Committee on Labor and Employment,
and Senator Bill Greene, Chairman of Senate Committee of Industrial Relations).
16. London, The Stunt Man: Issue of Safety v. Spectacle, L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1983,
(Calendar), at 1. As director Paul Stanley noted, "[w]e're in the business of creating
illusions. But illusions take time-you have to sit down with the art director, the stunt
people and the camera operators. On some shows now, they just go for reality." Id. at
2.
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sion ratings "require the filming of scenes which appear dan-
gerous and exciting. Thus, there is pressure on producers
within the industry to escalate the realism and hazardous ap-
pearance of stunts and action scenes."' 7
This escalation has led many professionals, such as camera
operators and stunt people, to complain that in order to
achieve bigger and more spectacular stunts "some employers
will ignore wisdom and the counsel of experts,"'8 placing the
employees in positions of great peril sometimes resulting in se-
rious injury or death.
The quest for the sensational is not the only employer moti-
vation that occasionally overrides safety considerations. Cost
is also a major concern:
[S] afety . . .is a touchy subject because it is tied partly to
profits. Television shows run on tight budgets and schedules;
and a director, eager to please his producer ... might not take
the time necessary to set up a complicated stunt safely, or
spend the money to rent a camera lens that would keep a cam-
era operator farther from the action.' 9
Motion picture directors are faced with the same demands of
adhering to time and budget constraints. 20 Also, the increased
incidences of actors performing their own stunts, often without
proper training or experience, has added to the perils of
filmmaking.2'
Although stunt work is inherently dangerous, it is not neces-
sarily unsafe. On the contrary, "spectacular stunts need not be
unsafe if set up correctly, by experienced people, given a
proper amount of time."22 The motion picture and television in-
dustries are vital to the California economy23 and should be en-
couraged, indeed invited, to work in the state. However,
equally vital are the needs and rights of the employees of this
17. Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 8 (introduction by Peter
Cooey, Senior Consultant, Assembly Committee on Labor and Employment).
18. Id. at 36-37 (statement of James Nissen, SAG Safety Director and Assistant
National Executive Secretary).
19. Farr, supra note 7, at 6.
20. Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 46 (statement of Arthur
Hiller, Directors Guild of America).
21. See Dunne, supra note 8 (statement of actor Kent McCord).
22. Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 39 (statement of Robert
Herron).
23. Production of motion pictures contributed $3.8 billion of revenue to the State of
California in 1979. Telephone interview with Kristan Wagner, State of California Mo-
tion Picture Council (Feb. 14, 1983).
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industry who deserve to be safeguarded against exposure to
truly unsafe working conditions.
III
California Laws and Regulations Governing
Motion Picture Safety
Currently there is no California legislation tailored to govern
safety in the television and motion picture industry. California
administers its occupational safety and health program pursu-
ant to the provisions of the federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) enacted in 1970.24 California's plan for to-
tal enforcement of OSHA, the California Occupational Safety
and Health Act (CAL/OSHA),25 was approved and adopted in
1973. CAL/OSHA applies to virtually all workers in the state,
including members of the television and motion picture
industry.
OSHA's purpose, as stated in the Act, is "to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions and to preserve our human re-
sources .... "26 Thus, the announced goal of OSHA is to pre-
vent accidents, rather than to police the industry in order to
punish violators of safety standards. The language used by
Congress indicates that the goal of this safety regulation is "ab-
solute safety" at all costs, and no mention is made of the poten-
tial expense of adhering to such regulation.27
OSHA permits a state to regulate occupational safety and
health within its borders, so long as the standards adopted are
at least as effective as the federal standards which have been
promulgated.28 Because CAL/OSHA meets the minimum fed-
eral requirements, there is no conflict between the state and
federal OSHA authorities. 29
24. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1976).
25. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 6300-6708 (West Supp. 1982). CAL/OSHA is used to refer
both to the California statute and to the agency charged with enforcing it, depending
on the context.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1976).
27. For a discussion of the debate between "absolute" and "cost-benefit" ap-
proaches to safety, see Marten, Regulation of the Transportation of Hazardous Materi-
als: a Critique and a Proposal, 5 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 345, 359-61 (1981).
28. CAL. LAB. CODE § 142.3(a)(West Supp. 1982).
29. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 140-147.1 (West Supp. 1982). The state Occupational Safety
and Health Standards Board may impose higher standards than has the federal gov-
ernment and it has done so in several areas, including control of pesticides and hazard-
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The rules of the California Occupational Safety and Health
Standards Board, codified in title 8 of the California Adminis-
trative Code entitled Industrial Relations, 3° pertain to safety in
all industries. They are typified by technical mandates relating
to specific industries, such as construction and electrical safety
orders. Title 8 of the California Administrative Code consists
of five lengthy volumes; the employer charged with ensuring
safety on the television or motion picture set must be familiar
with each of the technical areas covered by title 8 in order to
recognize violations of the safety standards.
Currently there are no specific rules regulating safety in the
television and motion picture industry in title 8 of the Califor-
nia Administrative Code. There is, however, a general duty of
employers and employees to promote safety and health in em-
ployment under California Labor Code sections 6400 and
6401.31 These sections require an employer to provide a rea-
sonably safe and healthful place of employment, to furnish
safety devices and safeguards, and to use reasonably adequate
methods to ensure safety.
Because the provisions of OSHA apply only to proceedings
against employers, the identity of the statutory employer when
an accident occurs is an important issue. The term "employer"
is defined in Labor Code section 3300(c) as "[e]very person in-
cluding any public service corporation, which has any natural
person in service."32 The "employer" on a television or movie
set is usually the producer, but his status may be indefinite
due to the relationship between the producer and the director,
contractual relationships regarding the financing of the pro-
duction, and contractual relationships between producers and
stunt contractors who provide their own crew members.33
In addition to the general responsibility of the employer to
provide a safe working environment for his employees, the em-
ployee has a statutory right to refuse to perform a task because
of fear of death or serious injury.34 However, in an industry
ous materials in the work place. Interview with Richard Stevens, Public Information
Officer of CAL/OSHA, in San Francisco (January 1983).
30. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. VIII (1983).
31. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 6400, 6401 (West Supp. 1982).
32. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3300(c) (West 1971).
33. The historical difficulty of determining employer responsibility in these more
complex employment relationships will be addressed in Part VI, along with other criti-
cisms of the current regulatory system. See infra text accompanying notes 106-118.
34. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6311 (West Supp. 1982). Camera operators may also base
No. 11
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such as the motion picture and television industry, where the
employee's future livelihood may depend upon appeasing
management, the personal choice to refuse to perform is
weakened.
Anyone who violates any of the rules of the California Occu-
pational Safety and Health Standards Board may be subject to
civil or criminal penalties. Alleged violations are classified as
either serious,35 general,36 or regulatory. 7 Depending on the
circumstances, violations may also be designated as repeat 38 or
willful. 3 9 Serious, repeat, and willful violations always receive
penalties. The maximum civil penalty for willful or repeat vio-
lations is $10,000 for each violation.40 The maximum penalties
for violations may be adjusted downward if the Division of Oc-
cupational Safety and Health determines that a lesser fine is
appropriate under the circumstances.4 '
Criminal penalties may be imposed if an employer or em-
ployee willfully violates an OSHA standard or order. A willful
violation causing death or permanent or prolonged impairment
to an employee carries a maximum fine of $10,000 or imprison-
ment of not more than six months, or both. If the violation is a
second offense, the penalty escalates to $20,000 and/or impris-
onment of not more than one year.4
refusal to do a shot, which endangers them or anyone else, on a provision in their
contracts. However, cinematographer Brianne Murphy pointed out that the provision
is meaningless because, "[y]ou can say no, but you won't work tomorrow." L.A. Times,
July 30, 1982, § VI (Calendar) at 9, col. 3.
35. A serious violation is defined as one which presents "substantial probability"
that an employee will suffer "death or serious physical harm. . . unless the employer
did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence
of the violation." CAL. LAB. CODE § 6432 (West Supp. 1982).
36. A general violation is one which does not fit the definition of serious, but which
does affect the safety and health of employees. CAL LAB. CODE § 6427 (West Supp.
1982).
37. A regulatory violation is one that pertains to permits, posting, recordkeeping,
or reporting requirements as established by OSHA. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6431 (West
Supp. 1982).
38. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6429 (West Supp. 1982).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Adjustments are based on some or all of the following: (1) the gravity of the
violation; (2) the size of the business as determined by the number of employees;
(3) the good faith of the employer as demonstrated by the quality and extent of the
safety program the employer has in effect, and the evidence of the employer's effort to
comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Act; (4) the business's or employer's
history of previous violations; (5) whether the employer is making a good faith effort to
eliminate quickly an alleged violation.
42. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6425 (West Supp. 1982). Certain hazards on the set do not fall
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IV
Labor and Management Measures to Enhance
Employee Safety
A. Intra-Industry Directive Orders
Although the California legislature and CAL/OSHA have
primary responsibility for the promulgation and enforcement
of regulations protecting worker safety within the state, volun-
tary intra-industry steps have also been taken to address film
industry safety problems. Both labor and management have
established safety committees in an effort to enhance em-
ployee safety.
The best known, and historically the most influential of these
committees, is the Motion Picture and Television Safety Com-
mittee, formed by the Alliance of Motion Picture and Televi-
sion Producers (AMPTP) under the auspices of the Contract
Services Administration Trust Fund (CSATF) 1 The purpose
of the Motion Picture and Television Safety Committee,
founded in June 1965, is to "benefit ... employees of the Mo-
tion Picture and Television Industry ... [and] to reduce the
number and severity of all types of injuries from occurring in
both post production and production operations."" This com-
mittee, sometimes referred to as the Labor-Management
Safety Committee of the Motion Picture and Television Film
Industry, establishes guidelines, publishes bulletins, and dis-
tributes pamphlets pertaining to safety standards within the
motion picture and television industry."
within the parameters of CAL/OSHA. Among the state and federal bodies with con-
current responsibility for regulation of film safety are: the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA), which regulates helicopters and other aircraft; the National
Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB), charged with investigating civil aircraft ac-
cidents and reporting on their probable causes; and the State Highway Patrol's Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles, which establishes standards for accidents involving moving
vehicles. A comprehensive analysis of the standards set by these governmental bodies
is beyond the scope of this note.
Use of wild animals, explosives, pyrotechnics, guns and other instruments for spe-
cial effects on the set is controlled by the intra-industry directive orders discussed in
Part IV infra, by the State Fire Marshal and by the federal government which licenses
gun dealers.
43. Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 11 (introduction by Peter
Cooey).
44. Id. at 56.
45. Examples of these pamphlets are entitled Recommended Safety Procedure Per-
taining to the Shoulder Mounted Camera and Working With Animals in the Motion
Picture and Television Film Industry.
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The bulletins and pamphlets developed and distributed by
the Labor-Management Safety Committee are referred to as di-
rective orders, but actually function as little more than recom-
mendations. For example, the Committee to Investigate
Safety Aspects of Camera Insert Cars,46 organized under the
auspices of the Motion Picture and Television Safety Commit-
tee, addressed the major areas of safety concern associated
with the use of such vehicles, and issued safety bulletins re-
garding their findings in July 1981.11 Yet in October 1982, James
Nissen, SAG Safety Director and Assistant National Executive
Secretary, identified insert cars as a "major [area] of concern"
and called for the establishment and enforcement of legislative
standards relating to various aspects of insert car operation.48
Thus, it is not surprising to find that the Labor-Management
Safety Committee is generally considered to be ineffective.
One reason, perhaps, for this perceived impotence is the
make-up of the committee, which, despite its membership of
employer and union representatives, is unable to do more than
promulgate recommendations. Two union participants stated
that the committee lacks both "teeth"49 and "backbone ... to
enforce the things that we spend months going over and work-
ing on. ' ° Additionally, a spokesman for the committee admits
that it has "little or no contact with ... [independent] pro-
ducer[s] .,15 The level of participation of the committee is con-
trolled by the producers who determine both the frequency
and continuity of the meetings.52 Despite a statement of pur-
pose which purports "historically . . . monthly meetings . . .
since June of 1965,"'51 these meetings were abruptly terminated
recently without explanation-a termination viewed with frus-
tration by members of the Screen Actors Guild Stunt and
46. Insert cars are modified vehicles which carry cameras and crew members to
follow the action shots and record the scene. See Film Safety Hearing Transcripts,
supra note 10, at 34.
47. Id. at 21-27.
48. Id. at 32 (statement of James Nissen). Mr. Nissen here refers to transportation
as the "major area of concern" but identifies insert cars as the focal point for his trans-
portation concerns at 34.
49. See Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 132 (Transcript of Hear-
ing, Oct. 8, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Transcript of Hearing].
50. Id. at 118.
51. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 49, at 96.
52. See Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 39 (statement of Robert
Herron).
53. Id. at 57.
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Safety Committee. 4
B. Additional Industry Safety Committees
The Directors Guild of America (DGA) also formed a Com-
mittee on Safety. Its activities consist largely of inviting union
representatives to attend as guests weekly meetings to discuss
their perceptions of safety problems. This practice is intended
to assist the DGA Committee on Safety in formulation of
recommendations. 5
On the employee side, committees have also been formed to
address industry safety problems. The National Stunt and
Safety Committee of SAG, formed over two years ago, has a
membership of over 140 actors, stunt players, and stunt coor-
dinators. 56 This committee established a three-man accident
investigation team with the purpose of "determining the prob-
able cause of the numerous accidents that have happened to
SAG members over the past couple of years. '57 This accident
investigation team aided the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) in the "Twilight Zone" investigation.58
The International Photographers, Local 659 and two leading
Hollywood stunt associations formed an ad hoc safety commit-
tee in an attempt to draw the attention of the entire Hollywood
community to the dangers to crew members in film production.
They also urged the movie studios to adopt more stringent
safety measures. This committee met with strong resistance
from producers and studio executives but has had greater suc-
cess since the "Twilight Zone" accident escalated the indus-
try's safety awareness. 59 The chairman of this committee
noted that "[t]he most dramatic change is in communication
.... Because safety isn't such a dirty secret any longer,
there's a lot more talking and cooperation on sets. 60
C. Collective Bargaining and Contracts
Collective bargaining is another important facet of the intra-
54. Id. at 39 (statement of Robert Herron).
55. Id. at 79 (letter from Elliot Silverstein to Robert Marta).
56. Id. at 38 (statement of Robert Herron).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. London, supra note 14, at 22-23.
60. Id. at 1.
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industry approach to safety regulation. The Screen Actors
Guild, a member of the AFL-CIO, represents over fifty thou-
sand stunt people and actors in motion picture, television, and
commercial and industrial film. The language of the SAG con-
tract states that players employed under the contract "shall, to
the extent possible, not be placed in circumstances hazardous
or dangerous to the individual. '61
The technical personnel necessary to produce a motion pic-
ture, including camera operators, first aid technicians, and spe-
cial effects people, are represented by their own individual
unions, but bargain jointly with the Association of Motion Pic-
ture and Television Producers through the International Alli-
ance of Theatrical and Stage Employees (IATSE). During
contract negotiations in October of 1982, Local 767, the Motion
Picture First Aid employees, attempted to establish a mini-
mum number of first-aid personnel that must be assigned to
productions, an area traditionally left to the discretion of pro-
duction company executives. This figure would have varied
depending on the number of people in the production company
or with the number of concurrent stunts being done.62 The pro-
ducers' negotiating team refused to establish such a standard
and declined further discussion of the matter. Thus, the extent
to which a contract can protect SAG and IATSE members de-
pends on their success in the negotiation process. The ques-
tion has been raised whether safety is too important an aspect
of motion picture and television employment to be relegated to
just another item on the bargaining table.63
D. Major Studio Safety Directors
An additional step taken by individual major studios to en-
hance employee safety has been the appointment of safety di-
rectors to oversee working conditions on their production sets.
At Paramount Pictures Corporation, the appointment of a
safety director in October 1979, at a point when the company
ranked fifteenth out of eighteen subsidiaries of Gulf Western
Industries, Inc. in losses resulting from workers' compensation
claims, resulted in an 89% reduction in similar losses within a
61. Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 31 (statement of James
Nissen).
62. Id. at 72 (letter from Marvin Haffner to Assemblyman Chet Wray).
63. Id. at 51 (statement of Robert Marta).
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period of only nine months.' While Paramount's success is
encouraging, it is not necessarily representative of the indus-
try as a whole, for Paramount's safety director monitors pri-
marily sitcoms requiring virtually no special effects.65
Nevertheless, the studio's development of a preventive, effec-
tive safety program reflects a spirit of safety awareness benefi-
cial to fostering intra-industry goals of maximizing employee
safety.
V
Bringing an Action: Workers' Compensation
Claims Versus Common Law Liability
With certain exceptions, the California workers' compensa-
tion law66 provides an exclusive remedy67 against the employer
for an industrial injury in California. The general workers'
compensation provision states that where an "employer-em-
ployee" relationship exists and where injury or death to the
employee arose out of and in the course of employment, the
employer is strictly liable regardless of negligence.68
As is discussed in Part VI, the statutory employer on a televi-
sion or motion picture set is usually determined to be the pro-
duction company.69 In each case it must also be decided
whether the injured performer was an independent contractor
or a "statutory employee. °70 This is often an issue in the mo-
tion picture and television industry, where stunt persons and
camera operators are hired for individual productions on a
free-lance basis. Generally, where there is proof that an in-
jured person was performing a service for an alleged employer
at the time of injury, it is the employer's burden to show that
64. Dienstein, CAL/OSHA News, A Safety Program's Impact at Paramount, at 4
(Feb. 1981).
65. Telephone interview with Ken McGowan, Safety Director, Paramount Pictures
Corp. (Jan. 1983).
66. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3201-4154 (West 1971). The California Workers' Compensa-
tion Act is administered by the Division of Industrial Accidents, one of the six divi-
sions of the Department of Industrial Relations. Id. § 56 (West Supp. 1982).
67. Id. § 3601 (West Supp. 1982); id. § 5300 (West 1971).
68. Id. § 3600 (West Supp. 1982).
69. See infra text accompanying notes 107-110.
70. See London, supra note 14, at 1. The rule in many tort cases is that an em-
ployer is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor of the latter's em-
ployees. E.g., Stark v. Weeks Real Estate, 94 Cal. App. 3d 965, 156 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1979);
Addison v. Susanville Lumber, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 394, 120 Cal. Rptr. 737 (1975); West
v. Guy F. Atkinson Constr. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 296, 59 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1967).
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the injured person was an independent contractor or otherwise
excluded from workers' compensation protection.7
Courts have used a number of criteria to determine whether
a person was an employee or an independent contractor.72 The
cases that apply these criteria do so inconsistently and often
seem result-oriented, finding an employment status that will
enable the injured party or his family to receive a large damage
award.73  The issue usually turns on factual considerations
such as control over the details of the worker's duties, the right
to discharge the worker, and the duty to pay the worker's sal-
ary. 7 Each of these practices is viewed in light of custom in the
industry.
A number of workers' compensation cases have found in-
71. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3357 (West 1971).
72. The guidelines for determining the existence of an employer-employee rela-
tionship are:
(1) The extent of actual control over the performance of the services by the
person for whom the services are rendered; the greater the control the
more likely there is to be an employment relationship.
(2) Whether or not the one performing the services is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business; if so, it is likely the worker is an independent
contractor.
(3) Whether the work is usually done under the direction of the employer
or by a specialist without supervision; if the work is done under the di-
rection of the employer, the worker is more likely to be considered an
employee.
(4) The amount of skill required; the more skill required, the greater the
indication of an independent contractor.
(5) Whether the person performing the services supplies the instrumentali-
ties of the business; if so, he is likely to be an independent contractor.
(6) The length of time services are performed; the greater the time, the
more likely an employment relationship.
(7) The method of payment; for example, by the job for independent con-
tractors and by time for employees.
(8) Whether or not the work done is part of the regular business of the em-
ployer; if so, the worker is more likely to be an employee.
(9) Whether or not the parties believe they are creating an employment
relationship.
(10) Whether the person performing the services is or is not in his own busi-
ness; if so, the worker is more likely to be an independent contractor.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958). The Restatement criteria have
been approved by the California courts. Tieberg v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals
Bd., 2 Cal. 3d 943, 950 & n.4, 471 P.2d 975, 980 & n.4, 88 Cal. Rptr. 175, 180 & n.4 (1970).
73. Frackman, The Failure to Pay Wages and Termination of Entertainment Con-
tracts in California: Some Implications of the Labor Code, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 333, 369
(1979).
74. J. MASTORIS, SUMMARY OF 1979-1980 CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAw
3 (1980).
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jured performers to be employees.7" In Durea v. Industrial Ac-
cident Commission,76 the Industrial Accident Commission
concluded that a stunt rider was performing services for a mo-
tion picture and television actor as an employee. The Commis-
sion considered it important that the actor supplied the props,
had general supervision and immediate control of the details of
the performance, and prepared and arranged the show in
which the stuntman was hired to assist.
Similarly, in Locklear v. William Fox Vaudeville Co.," a
stunt aviator/motion picture actor was found to be an em-
ployee rather than an independent contractor. The case
turned on the fact that the deceased was subject to the direc-
tion and control of the defendant company as to the details of
his performance, even though the actor was allowed artistic
discretion in performing his act and provided his own plane
and pilots.78
A contrary determination as to employment status has been
reached in cases where theatrical companies have hired enter-
tainers to perform at a fixed price for a given number of per-
formances.79 In Brosius v. Orpheum Theatre Co.,80 the
California Court of Appeal found that a performer who person-
ally prepared and arranged his act was not an employee within
the Workers' Compensation Act because the theatre corpora-
tion did not have complete control over the performer. Like-
wise, in Helekunihi v. Liberty Theatre,81 a musical performer
was held to be an independent contractor although the theatre
manager had demanded changes in the act with which the per-
former had complied. The court found it to be customary prac-
tice in theatrical circles for theatres to suggest changes in the
details of acts; therefore, the manager's exercise of this limited
degree of control did not establish employee status.82
Where the injured performer seeks damages in excess of
75. E.g., Seale v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 6 Cal. Comp. Cases 306 (1941); Git-
terman v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 5 Cal. Comp. Cases 181 (1940); Crowson
v. H-A Circus Corp., 4 Cal. Comp. Cases 52 (1938); Locklear v. William Fox Vaudeville
Co., 8 I.A.C. 211 (1921).
76. 206 Cal. App. 2d 691, 699, 23 Cal. Rptr. 902, 906 (1962).
77. Locklear, 8 I.A.C. at 211.
78. Id. at 212.
79. E.g., Smith v. Fox Theater, 20 I.A.C. 17 (1934); Helekunihi v. Liberty Theatre, 14
I.A.C. 145 (1927).
80. 16 Cal. App. 2d 61, 66 (1936).
81. 14 I.A.C. 145 (1927).
82. Id.
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workers' compensation, he may try to argue that he was an in-
dependent contractor rather than an employee. This approach
was used in Miller v. Municipal Theatre Ass'n of St. Louis,83
where actress Ann Miller brought a tort suit against the city of
St. Louis and the Municipal Theatre Association of St. Louis
for injuries sustained during the play "Anything Goes." The
actress based her claim of independent contractor status on
the facts that she provided certain "tools of the trade" such as
her own hairdresser, that she was paid higher wages than
other participants because of her talent and fame, and that she
retained and exercised, in accord with industry custom, "crea-
tive control"84 over her performance.85 Basing its decision on
all of these factors, the court held that neither the city nor the
municipal theatre association had met its burden of proving
the affirmative defense that plaintiff was a statutory employee
and therefore barred from bringing a tort cause of action.86
The injured employee and his family are precluded under
the Workers' Compensation Act from bringing an action in tort
or contract against the employer unless the employer failed to
carry workers' compensation insurance or to otherwise comply
with the requirements of the Act.87 However, the Workers'
Compensation Act does not prohibit common law action
against fellow employees. 8 8 In order to recover against an em-
ployee, the injured party or his family must be able to show
that injury or death was caused by a willful and unprovoked
act of physical aggression by the other employee, by intoxica-
tion of the fellow employee, or, as is probably easiest to prove,
by an act sufficient to support a finding of willful and serious
misconduct.89
Thus, under the current system, workers' compensation pro-
83. 540 S.W.2d 899 (Mo. 1976).
84. Creative control was defined as "the right of a performer with her high status
to designate and control the means by which she performs her work in reaching the
desired results or effect." Id. at 903.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 906.
87. Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 204, 155 Cal. Rptr. 486, 491
(1979); Mitchell v. Hizer, 73 Cal. App. 3d 499, 503, 140 Cal. Rptr. 790, 792 (1977); Eckis v.
Sea World Corp., 64 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6, 134 Cal. Rptr. 183, 186 (1976); Dixon v. Ford Motor
Co., 53 Cal. App. 3d 499, 503, 125 Cal. Rptr. 872, 874 (1975).
88. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1982); Miner v. Superior Court of Fresno
County, 30 Cal. App. 3d 597, 600, 106 Cal. Rptr. 416, 418 (1973); Lowman v. Stafford, 226
Cal. App. 2d 31, 39, 37 Cal. Rptr. 681, 685 (1964).
89. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1982).
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vides a limited damage award which can be supplemented by
more sizeable tort claims recovered from the director, stunt co-
ordinator and other performers. These employees may in turn
seek indemnity from the production company.
VI
Inadequacies in the Current Regulatory System
The current regulatory system described in Part III has not
been a complete failure. Statistics suggest that the incidence
of injury is no greater in the motion picture and television in-
dustry than in other industries.90 However, there are striking
inadequacies in the current regulatory scheme which compel
improvement.
A. Lack of Specific Rules
A major problem with the current law is the absence of spe-
cific safety regulations in the motion picture and television in-
dustry. The wide variety of situations filmed and the unique
nature of the industry require the use of substances and stunts
which fall outside of the purview of the general labor laws.
Thus, the California Administrative Code and Labor Code are
often inapplicable. Certainly, in light of these unusual pres-
sures, the broad mandate to all industries that employers pro-
vide a safe working environment for their employees 91 seems
to be a contradiction in terms when applied to the film indus-
try. Management must sometimes instruct employees to vio-
late sections of title 8 in order to create special effects. For
example, filming a James Bond scene or a war movie requires
that laws proscribing the use of explosives and firearms be
bent or broken. When the CAL/OSHA safety standards do not
apply, management and workers use what is known in the in-
dustry as "alternative safety," which really amounts to unwrit-
ten safety rules or directives found in the industry safety
bulletins, coupled with a lot of luck.92
In addition to a dearth of legislation aimed directly at safety
in the motion picture and television industry, the applicable
regulations governing film safety are voluminous and scattered
90. See supra note 10.
91. CAL. LAB. CODE § 6400 (West Supp. 1982).
92. Telephone interview with Robert Marta, Chairman, International Photogra-
phers, Local 659 (Jan. 5, 1983).
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among many governmental agencies. The result is that the
regulations are difficult for employers and employees to track
down and equally hard for the agencies to monitor and
enforce.93
B. Suggested Reforms: Stricter Penalties, Increased Regulation
and Firmer Licensing Requirements
The Assembly Labor and Employment Committee and the
Senate Industrial Relations Committee highlighted a number
of inadequacies and omissions in the current California laws
when they convened in October 1982 to discuss safety in the
motion picture and television industry. It was generally
agreed by the representatives of SAG, members of the Interna-
tional Photographers, Local 659, and representatives of CAL/
OSHA that current fines for safety violations are too low to de-
ter unsafe practices on the set.94 It was stated that "producers
spend more . . . on coffee and donuts"9 5 than the maximum
penalty of $1,000 for a serious violation or $10,000 for a willful
violation. The feeling among workers and union officials is that
production companies violate the laws because they know that,
if they are caught, the maximum OSHA penalty will be a small
fine.96
SAG has isolated four major areas of weakness in the cur-
rent legislative scheme: lack of first aid on the set, inadequate
'licensing requirements for insert-car operators, lack of regula-
tion in the areas of props and special effects, and under-en-
forcement of child labor regulations.9
CAL/OSHA does not require that a nurse or other trained
medical personnel with extensive first aid equipment be on the
93. Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 32 (statement of James
Nissen).
94. Id. at 42 (statement of Barrie Howard, Co-Chair SAG Children's Committee);
id. at 52 (statement of Robert Marta, Chairman, International Photographers, Local
659); id. at 64 (statement of Art Carter).
95. Id. at 37 (statement of James Nissen).
96. Id. at 42 (statement of Barrie Howard).
It should be noted that in a recent L.A. Times article, Robert Herron claimed that
there has been a "tremendous upgrade" recently in safety standards and attributed
this increase in safety awareness to concern over legal costs. "Everyone thought they
were protected, . . . [blut T1wilight Zone' showed that they're not. Anyone can be
sued for negligence." London, supra note 14, at 1. Perhaps safety awareness will be
heightened further in light of the manslaughter charges which have been brought in
the Twilight Zone case. See supra note 2.
97. Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 32 (statement of James
Nissen).
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set when stunts are filmed. The only requirement is that some-
one with a first-aid certificate and suitable facilities for medical
assistance be available. 8 The number of first-aid personnel as-
signed to a set, and, in some cases, the type of equipment to be
used, are left to management's discretion.99 SAG contends
that licensing requirements for first-aid personnel are not very
stringent.100 According to the First Aid Local 767 of IATSE,
there is no requirement that safety personnel be present dur-
ing off-site film-making on location. 101
SAG representatives are also critical of the fact that cur-
rently any licensed driver can be hired to drive an insert car.0 2
Due to the hazards of overloading the cars with equipment and
people, driving at high speeds and taking close turns, SAG rep-
resentatives believe that legislators should create a special li-
censing class for insert car drivers. In addition, it is felt that
standards should be set regarding the acceptable weight of in-
sert cars and their cargo. 0 3
In the area of props and special effects, SAG representatives
are concerned that existing licensing qualifications for pyro-
technic technicians are both inadequate and underenforced. 10 4
They also believe that additional regulations are needed to
govern the use of explosives and that legislation should be
promulgated to absolutely prohibit use of live ammunition on
the set.10 5
C. Defining Employer Responsibility
The difficulty of determining the source of employer respon-
sibility for safety under the current regulatory system is a seri-
ous drawback. 0 6 The problem of defining which "employer" is
responsible stems in part from the complicated management
hierarchy consisting of stunt coordinator, director, and
producer.
Directors are responsible for the artistic transformation of
98. Id.
99. Id. at 72-3 (letter from Marvin Haffner).
100. Id. at 32 (statement of James Nissen).
101. Id. at 72 (letter from Marvin Haffner).
102. Id. at 34 (statement of James Nissen).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 35.
106. Id. at 10 (introduction by Peter Cooey); id. at 64 (statement by Art Carter);
Transcript of Hearings, supra note 49, at 108.
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written script to film. Their jobs often involve critical judg-
ment calls in deciding whether or not to film a potentially haz-
ardous scene. Under the current regulatory scheme, there is
no consistent way to sanction directors who abuse their discre-
tion because directors are not the statutory employers under
the labor code.107
The employer is most commonly the film's producer, who
also retains ultimate authority to make changes in the produc-
tion schedule. One vice-president of production stated that
producers "defer to the directors" and suggested that if a situa-
tion arose where a stunt coordinator or special effects person
complained that the production schedule did not allow them
enough time to safely and properly prepare the stunts, suffi-
cient time would be allocated. He also stated, however, that if
a camera operator or stunt performer raised a safety issue or
objection, "[ilt would be brought to the director's attention
normally because he would be the one to see if there could be
any compromises made."'1 8 One union representative ex-
plained the producer-director authority relationship in this
manner: "While the producer is the employer, the director has
a lot of control over who is going to get the job and who is going
to get called back." He then suggested that in an instance
where employees feel an unsafe situation exists, "personnel
[should] have the right to meet in confidence with a represen-
tative of a producer without the director being there .... This
would give the personnel the opportunity to communicate with
his [sic] true employer, the producer, outside of the [earshot]
of the director."'10 9
It must be noted that the producers suggest that stunt per-
formers are often independently responsible for creating haz-
ardous working conditions. In a bisiness where the stunt
performer is "only as good as his last stunt," the pressure on
these performers to opt for "spectacle over safety" is often very
great. 10 Also, the producers claim that an over-zealous stunt
performer is one factor the producers cannot completely
107. Id. at 9 (introduction by Peter Cooey).
108. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 49, at 108.
109. Id. at 130-31.
Additionally, by contract, every Screen Extras Guild (SEG) membership card re-
quires the inclusion of this provision on its face: "Know your rights in regard to haz-
ardous work. The producer must notify you at the time of the call if you will be
required to perform hazardous work." Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
110. London, supra note 16, at 1.
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control."'
The industry's lack of formal qualification procedures for en-
tering the stunt profession may contribute to this problem.
Currently, the only prerequisite for performing stunts is get-
ting hired-perhaps without the training, experience, or skill
required for demanding stunts.
Similarly, there are no formal qualifications for the position
of stunt coordinator-a role described as "an increasingly vital
link in the chain of command as stunts grow more frequent
and more dangerous."" 2 Paul Baxley, the stunt coordinator on
the television show "Dukes of Hazzard," expressed scorn for
stunt performers who are reluctant to attempt his production's
daring stunt work. He stated,
These stunt guys who tell you to do "illusions" are stupid. How
can you do an illusion of a car flying through the air or smash-
ing into a tree? This is a cruel, violent business, and that's why
these guys make $150,000 a year."3
It is, however, only the most well-known and consistently em-
ployed stunt performers who earn such high yearly incomes." 4
More typically, stunt performers and camera operators rue the
industry practice of compensating them for participating in
life-threatening maneuvers with a sixty dollar bonus." 5
Compounding the problems of employer liability are numer-
ous "fly-by-night" independent production corporations.
Whereas an established producer from one of the major stu-
dios may be relatively visible as the employer, there are
"quickly established and folded corporations who exist for the
sole purpose of producing one motion picture and then they're
gone. They are given a substantial amount of money by a par-
ent corporation which then later will assume no responsibility
for any potential tragedy."1 6
The employer liability question is also complicated by the in-
dependent contractor status of some members of a production
crew. This independent contractor defense may be asserted by
the producer when an independent stunt coordinator has been
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 3.
114. Allen, They Live to Leap Another Day, FAMILY SAFETY, Winter 1982-83 at 30.
This article states that "a good stunt man can make $100,000 a year" but seems to sug-
gest that this figure is on the high side of the industry pay scale.
115. London, supra note 14, at 22.
116. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 49, at 124-25.
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contracted with to provide his own crew. According to more
recent cases, however, policy considerations dictate that the
employer, rather than the independent contractor, be held lia-
ble." ' The delegation of responsibility for employee safety is
further complicated by the limited liability of individual em-
ployers. Producers, for example, are protected by the "corpo-
rate veil" of production companies, leaving the distinct
impression among workers that responsibility is not being
placed where it belongs." 8
VII
Proposals for Reforming Film Industry Safety
Regulations
The present system for regulation of safety in the motion pic-
ture and television industry does not adequately protect that
industry's employees. In part, the system has failed because
current standards were not promulgated to address the special
characteristics of this unique industry. Additionally, the in-
dustry's efforts at self-regulation have failed to supplement ad-
equately the existing legislative network. Thus, specific
legislation is needed to fill the void which presently exists in
this area of the law.
Legislative standards are needed in many of the areas that
are currently governed by the directive orders described in
Part IV. As was previously stated, these orders are simply
guidelines written by management to be applied and enforced
by management. Thus, they lack the authority, uniformity, and
enforcement mechanisms which legislation on the same sub-
jects would provide. Certainly, most legislators do not have
the film industry knowledge and expertise possessed by the
members of the Labor-Management Safety Committee who
drafted these directives. Therefore, the input of qualified
members of the film community should be a vital ingredient in
117. E.g., Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal.2d 245, 253, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20, 25 (1968) (em-
ployer held liable under the "peculiar risk" doctrine for injuries received by its in-
dependent contractor's employee); Henderson Brothers Stores, Inc. v. Smiley, 120 Cal.
App. 3d 903, 910-15, 174 Cal. Rptr. 875, 877-81 (1981) (employer held liable for the torts of
an independent roofing contractor under the "peculiar risk" doctrine); Castro v. State
of California, 114 Cal. App.3d 503, 509-15, 170 Cal. Rptr. 734, 737-41 (1981) (employer held
liable for the injuries of its independent contractor's employee under the "peculiar
risk" doctrine).
118. See Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 53 (statement of Robert
Marta).
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drafting legislation which would, in effect, make, the safety di-
rectives binding laws."l 9
A critical area which should become a target for new legisla-
tion is controlled use of explosives on the set. It has been al-
leged that the Vic Morrow accident was caused in part by
human error in identifying the potency of a bomb which was
used to create a special effect prior to the fatal accident. 120 Two
proposals for regulation of explosives are the dating of bombs
stored on the set because they become more explosive over
time, and the color-coding of bombs according to their potency
so as to reduce the human error factor. 12 1
A related matter in need of legislative attention is a prohibi-
tion on the use of live ammunition on the set. Although blanks
are a safe and effective substitute, 22 live ammunition has re-
portedly been used on a number of occasions. 23
Legislation to require the presence of a safety monitor on the
set should also be introduced. The need for this is most
strongly illustrated by the current inability of film industry em-
ployees to say "no" to a risk, which they perceive to be too
great, without jeopardizing future employment in the tight-knit
Hollywood community. The safety marshal's role could be
compared to that of the welfare worker required by state child
labor laws. 24 Despite the fact that employees of the film in-
dustry who have reached the age of majority can, unlike chil-
dren, protect themselves, they have been put in the untenable
position of protecting their lives at the expense of their liveli-
hoods. As workers in the state of California under the protec-
tion of CAL/OSHA, these employees have a right to expect
"safe and healthful working conditions ... ."125 The presence
of a safety marshal on those sets where stunts are in progress
would help ensure that these employees' lives and livelihoods
are adequately safeguarded.
119. At present, no legislation has been introduced. The California Legislature is
proceeding cautiously in the hope that the industry will respond to legislative pressure
with improved self-regulation.
120. L.A. Times, Aug. 18, 1982, § II at 1, col. 4.
121. Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 35 (statement of James
Nissen).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See CAi. LAB. CODE § 1396 (West 1971); see also Film Safety Hearing Tran-
scripts, supra note 10, at 42 (statement of Barrie Howard, SAG Children's Committee).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
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In a similar vein, the legislature should set forth laws requir-
ing the presence of adequate first aid personnel on the set,
rather than leaving this to the discretion of the producer.
Guidelines similar to those suggested by Motion Picture First
Aid Employees, Local 767, in recent contract negotiations could
be established, tying the number of required first aid person-
nel to the number of concurrent stunts being performed and
the number of people involved.'26 Additionally, a reasonable
supply of first aid equipment should be required on the set in-
stead of being relegated to the producer's discretion.'27
One of the most inadequate current legislative promulga-
tions is also one of the simplest to rectify-the absurdly low
monetary penalties imposed for violations of the rules of the
California Occupational Safety and Health Standard Board.'28
The maximum civil penalties of $1,000 for serious violations,
and of $10,000 for willful violations must be substantially in-
creased if they are to function as a deterrent to unsafe prac-
tices in many industries. Fines this trivial do little more than
make a mockery of OSHA's penalties, especially when the in-
dustry in question is a multi-million dollar employer. As Art
Carter, chief of CAL/OSHA testified, "[w] hen you are dealing
with any multi-million dollar employer--oil industry, movie in-
dustry, contractors, and so forth-to suggest this dollar amount
is going to be a deterrent is ... out of the realm of reasonable-
ness."'129 Because current motion picture and television pro-
ductions' operating budgets regularly figure in the multi-
million dollar range, the paltry OSHA fines cannot be expected
to deter safety code violations. Thus, in order to have any sig-
nificance as a deterrent to the film industry, and perhaps to
other multi-million dollar industries, the civil monetary penal-
ties must be increased with respect to high budget employers.
In addition to the enactment of stricter monetary penalties
which would act as a deterrent to unsafe practices in the indus-
try, alternative measures such as suspension and revocation of
licenses are strongly recommended. Whereas money to pay
fines can be allotted as a predictable business expense, the
show would literally not go on if the producer's licenses to hire
126. Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 72 (letter from Marvin
Haffner to Assemblyman Chet Wray).
127. Id. at 73.
128. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
129. Transcript of Hearing, supra note 49, at 141.
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actors, camera operators or stunt people were revoked or sus-
pended. Another recommended penalty with a "bite" is forbid-
ding the use of the abused article, such as explosives or
ammunition, if the safety regulations governing the article are
willfully violated.
Finally, within the industry, steps should be taken to include
employee groups as members of the Motion Picture and Tele-
vision Safety Committee. This would foster a cooperative
spirit and enhance equality of representation, thereby ensur-
ing all concerned parties the opportunity to participate in for-
mulation of industry-initiated answers to safety concerns.
VIII
Conclusion
The present system of film safety regulation is inadequate to
optimize employee safety. The state legislative regulations are
scattered throughout numerous codes, making them difficult to
locate and enforce. Additionally, they are inapplicable in
many situations that arise in motion picture and television
filming because of the unique nature of the industry. Intra-in-
dustry directives lack both force and enforcement mecha-
nisms, and amount to little more than ineffectual
recommendations. Specific laws should be enacted to fill the
omissions in the legislative scheme regarding film safety; omis-
sions that have resulted in serious injuries and deaths. The
goal of both the industry and the legislature should be to
achieve the optimal level of employee safety, thereby "creating
merely the illusion of danger, not the reality."'130
130. Film Safety Hearing Transcripts, supra note 10, at 37 (statement of James
Nissen).
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